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COURT-REFERRED ADR AND THE
LAWYER-MEDIATOR: IN SERVICE
OF WHOM?
Louis J Weber, Jr. *
HEN the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) idea began in
Searly 1977, it was a very noble and selfless undertaking. Without
Ve exception in the last 36 years, the only lasting, positive impacts the
legal profession has had on the public have been those projects that benefit
the public as opposed to benefitting lawyers. Some of these projects are law
related education in our public schools; expanded legal services to the poor
on a pro bono basis through interest on lawyers' trust accounts; institutional-
ized lawyer referral services; the cooperation between the bar and realtors
which resulted in simplified, pro-consumer real estate forms; and public in-
volvement in our professional activities. ADR had at least as much poten-
tial and appeal as did law related education because of its aim to resolve
community and individual disputes before they blossomed into lawsuits. In
other words, disputes would be resolved with the aid of third party neutrals
and by the disputants themselves instead of the disputes being settled by
courts after entering the court system. This is a fine distinction perhaps, but
a significant one. Additional incentives include cost savings to the parties,
cost savings to the state, time saved both by the parties and the system,
reduction of the burden on the courts, and the empowerment of the parties
to resolve their own differences instead of having them settled by a judge,
jury or even by their own lawyers.'
This notion of helping the public without involving lawyers, lawsuits and
the courts had a slow beginning. While the concept was endorsed by the
State Bar of Texas in 1977, it was not until the fall of 1980 that Houston and
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later Dallas were able to raise adequate funds to begin dispute resolution
centers. Other cities followed, but dollars were hard to find. Public interest
was difficult to generate as well. Lawyers had a tendency to resent the idea,
probably because it suggested a drastic change from the usual way of doing
things and perhaps because their fees would be affected. Judges were also
slow to embrace the idea. Even when legislative changes allowed a portion
of filing fees to be set aside to fund dispute resolution alternatives, the re-
sponse of lawyers, judges, and the public was lukewarm. However, the legis-
lation provided considerable relief for financially-strapped mediation centers.
Interestingly, public volunteers willing to aid disputants in settling their dif-
ferences have been in abundance since the beginning of the ADR movement.
It is equally interesting that significant lawyer interest in this endeavor in
Texas did not begin until after passage of the 1987 ADR Act 2 which, among
other things, tied ADR into the court system. The Act also provided that
court-appointed or third-party neutrals be compensated by the litigants or
through court costs. 3
At the same time, Texas was entering into a recession and a general eco-
nomic downturn. This resulted in a very significant change in the legal pro-
fession which still continues to some degree. From the late '70s through the
mid-'80s, law firms rapidly increased their capacities to perform legal serv-
ices. Fee income increased and times were very good for lawyers as well as
for their varied clients; however, when the economy soured, so did lawyer
income. The result was the reality of law firms terminating large numbers of
staff personnel, associates and partners. Even some of the best law school
graduates could not find employment in law firms at a time when more and
more graduates were being produced by our law schools.
Strangely, and perhaps predictably, ADR "suddenly"-after ten years of
marginal interest-began to be popular, not only with some courts, but also
with some lawyers. Despite strong efforts by those who had labored in the
ADR vineyard for years, the public remained generally unaware of this al-
ternative to lawsuits and lawyers. This is still the case even though the ADR
movement is fueled now by increased court referrals to third-party neutrals
on a fee basis after the dispute has become a lawsuit.
The result of this court-referred ADR, as opposed to the attempted reso-
lution of disputes by mediators before the parties enter the court system,
should perhaps be described as an "additional" dispute resolution mecha-
nism instead of an "alternative" method of resolving disputes. This is be-
cause the mechanism begins after suit is filed and usually after most of the
trial preparation is completed. At this point, the clients are ordered by the
court to enter into an ADR procedure and to pay additional fees to partici-
pate in the ADR process. While in many cases this may still save dollars for
the clients and time for the courts, certainly in some cases it will not: most
of the trial preparation has usually been completed, the court has handled
the usual pre-trial matters and all that remains is the trial itself. In addition,
2. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 152.001 (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1993).
3. Id. § 152.004.
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most trial lawyers and judges say that over ninety percent of law suits filed
settle without trial or ADR intervention.
This manner and practice of ADR may not be an alternative to the courts
at all; as it is being predicated on a civil filing, it should properly be consid-
ered an administrative aid, disguised as an "alternative" in order to make it
more palatable to the public. For instance, with the natural push towards
settlement throughout our systems of justice, both state and federal 4 are we
not actually shifting more cost to the parties themselves? This attorney-me-
diator dominated process is not an alternative method of dispute resolution
when it occurs only within the litigation framework. More properly, it is an
"add-on" procedure. It may also be a more costly form of settlement than
most of the ninety percent of civil cases that eventually settle without the
benefit of ADR.
In Dallas County, a vast majority of court-referred mediations are made
to attorneys who are on lists kept by individual courts or by a county ADR
coordinator. Inclusion on these lists is aggressively pursued by almost all
lawyers interested in receiving court appointments. Various attorney-media-
tor owned training programs aid lawyers in being included on these lists
after completion of their courses, as such training is mandatory for most
court appointments. This desire for court appointments in fee-generating
cases is evidenced by the plethora of attorney-mediators advertising their
"success rates" and their ADR "institutes."
For centuries, lawyers have enjoyed a monopoly in the practice of law.
The rationale for this monopoly has always been that it was for "the good of
the public." While the rationale is noble, the profession has been stung by
great criticism of this monopoly in recent years. It now appears, at least in
Dallas County, that attorney-mediators are attempting to extend this mo-
nopoly to the mediation arena, except for cases that will not generate media-
tion fees. Non-revenue cases will continue to be referred to Family Services,
the Juvenile Department, or Dispute Mediation Service.
The evidence for a growing monopoly of court-referred mediation is mani-
fold, including training programs, evolving standards of practice, and
mandatory qualifications that are being devised by lawyers, skewed to legal
practitioners, in service of lawyers. One has only to observe the abundant
lawyer-mediator marketing as evidence of the strong revenue interest court-
referred ADR has to lawyers competing in a slumping or declining lawyer
economy. Look also to the advertised "success ratio" or "settlement ratio"
printed by some lawyer mediators. Does this come at the expense of being
neutral? If a person is trying to have a high "success ratio," does it perhaps
cause a possible conflict of interest? If a person is attempting to enhance
"success" or "settlement," is it natural and human to pressure the weakest
party to make the critical accommodations? Is this not a short term,
mechanical settlement instead of a long term, comprehensive resolution of
4. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 477 (Supp. 11 1990); COMMITTEE ON
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, APRIL 15, 1992.
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the differences between the parties? Does this lawyer-mediator phenomenon
in Dallas, and perhaps other cities in Texas, represent a crisis in the court
system? Are the dockets really so staggering? If so, are there other ways to
manage the dockets? If the court referrals to lawyer-mediators are to ease
court dockets, are we to assume that there will no longer be a need to expand
the number of courts?
Does the lawyer-mediator phenomenon reflect the economic crisis in the
legal marketplace? In the Southern and Eastern Federal Districts of New
York, volunteers, lawyer and non-lawyer, perform the court referred media-
tions. If this were the case in Texas or if the process were removed from the
litigation framework, would our lawyers be as enthusiastic about mediating
cases?
Does the lawyer-mediator phenomenon represent a crisis in the profes-
sion? If the settlement process, in the main, has been commercialized, then
many wonder if we have not lost sight of the original, service-oriented goal
of ADR which arose over a decade ago. Perhaps the development of the
lawyer-mediator phenomenon has taken place without regard to our Texas
community mediation experience. This considerable ADR experience has
been dominated by volunteer commitment and responsiveness to the needs
of the public and the court system. Some have suggested that our more
recent Texas lawyer-mediation phenomenon is predicated on enhancing both
the revenue prospects of lawyers and the monopoly to practice law. This is
perhaps so, although many attorney-mediators support a requirement that
they conduct two pro bono cases annually in order to be eligible to receive
court referrals. Volunteer service is now the "price" for being on the court
referral lists, which has little to do with the commitment and responsibility
for public service by the profession.
We as lawyers have a unique opportunity to provide service to the public
as well as leadership to the profession through the ADR movement. As
mediators, we can become true peacemakers without being considered
greedy. We can use our legal training and interpersonal skills to actually
help resolve differences rather than just win cases. We are at a critical point
in the profession as we see ADR becoming more and more popular; we have
an obligation to avoid the temptation to merely make money on a hot com-
modity. We have the potential to affect significantly the attitudes of disput-
ing parties from the "win at all cost" mindset to the "win-win solution" by
which disputes are diffused. Our community, our state, and our country are
all experiencing problems emanating from disputes-between individuals,
corporations, and institutions. Even our young people are exhibiting aggres-
sive behavior through gangs who settle their disputes in inappropriate ways.
We as lawyers and leaders have to start somewhere to provide a means by
which disputes are resolved that does not merely line our pockets. If we
truly serve the public, we will find that service is rewarded by the confidence
of our clients, whether in the traditional mode of providing legal services or
in this emerging alternative for dispute resolution.
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